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LOUISA C. Ml'SKOPF ct al., Appellants, v. CORNING
IIOSPIT A L DISTRICT, Respondent.
[1] State of California-Liability.-The rule of governmental immunity from tort liability must be discarded as mistaken and
unjust.
[2] Hospitals-Tort Liability.-A hospital is not protected from
tort liability by thc rule of charitable immunity, this doctrine
having been abolished.
[8] State of California-Liability.-The state, like a municipality,
can act in n proprictary capacity.
[4] HospItals-Actions Against.-A suit against a county hospital
or hospital district is against an entity legally and financially
capablc of satisfying a judgment.
[5] State of California-Liability.-The rule of governmental immunity for tort is an anachronism, without rational support,
and has existed only by the force of inertia. It does not
actually exist, but has becomc riddled with exccptions both
legislative and judicial, and the exceptions operate so illogically as to cause serious inequality.
[6] Hospitals-Actions Against.-Since the Legislature has by
virtue of Health & Sa f. Code, § 32121, subd. (b), set forth the
manner [all actions and proceedings] and the courts [all
courts] in which suits against a hospital district may be
brought, in such suits judgment may be entered against the
hospital district.
[7] State of California-Actions Against.-Const., art. XX, § 6,
providing that suits may be brought against the state in such
manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law, should
not be interpreted as establishing the rule of immunity; it
provides merely for :J. legislative consent to suit.
[8] Id.-Actions Against: Hospitals-Actions Against.-Although
Gov. Code, § 6U, allowing the state to "sue or be sued," and
Health & Saf. Code, § 32121, subd. (b), permitting a hospital
[IJ See Cal.Jur.2d, State of California, § 155 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
States, Territories and Dependencies, § 73.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Hospitals and Asylums, § 18; Am.Jur.,
Hospitnls an(l A~yJulll~, § 18.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3,5, 9-12] State of California, § 57;
[2, 14] Hospitals, § S; [4, 6] Hospitals, § 15; [7] State of California, § 67; [8] State of California, § 67; Hospitals, § 15; [13J
State of California, § 58; [15] Public Officers, § 6L

212

)

MUSKOPF L'. CORNING HOSPITAL DIST.

[55 C.2d

district "to 8ue and be sued," have been judicially constnletl as
providing ouly a wniver from suit nnd not a wuiver of substantive immunity, their continuous reenactment indicntes a clear
legislative purpose to remove all procedural obstacles when
the state is liable.
[9] Id. - LiabilitY.-Statutes removing governmental immunity
from liability in certain areas should be interpreted as meaning
only what they say: that in the areas indicated there shall be
no governmental immunity; they leave to tne court whether it
should adhere to its own rule of immunity in otJ.1er areas.
[10] Id.-Liability.-From the inception of the "nile" of governmental immunity from liability there has been constant judicial restriction going hand in hand with accompanying legi;;lative rcstl'iction, the concept of proprietary acts bas been
extended to the state and its agencies, and there is governmental liability for nuisances even when they involve governmental activity.
[11] Id.-Liability.-In formulating "rules" and "exceptions" relating to governmental immunity from liability, it should be
borne in mind that when there is negligence the rule is liability, immunity is the exception.
[12] Id.-Liability.-Abrogation of governmental imlUunity from
liability does not mean that the state is liable for all hanns
that result from its activities. Both the state and individuals
are free to engage in many activities that result in harm to
others so long as such activities are not tortious.
[13] Id.-Liability.-Although it "is not a tort for Government
to govern" and basic policy decisions of government within
constitutional limitations are therefore necessarily non tortious,
it does not follow that the state is immune from liability for
torts of its agents. Once it is determined that the state
through its agents has cOlllmitted a tort, it must meet its
obligations therefor.
[14] Hospitals-Tort Liability.-The employees of a hospital district are not immune from liability for their negligence in
caring for and treating a paying patient in a hospital operated
by the district.
[15] Public Officers - Civil Liability.-Go,'ernmcnt officials are
liable for the. negligent performance of their ministerial duties,
but are not hable for their discretionary acts within the scope
of their authority, even if it is alleged that they acted maliciously. Such immunity is not designed to protect the guilty,
but rests on the ground that it is impossible to know whether
the claim is well founded until the case has been tried and that

[15] See Cal.Jur.2d, Public Officers, § 144 et seq.; Am.Jur., Public
Officers, §§ 289.5, 303 et seq.
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it would be better to lrave unrrures:-ed the wrongs done by
dishonest officers than to ~ubjeet those who try to do their duty
to the constant dread of retaliation.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tehama
County. Curtiss E. Wetter, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for injuries sustained by a paying
patient in a hospital operated by defendaut hospital district.
Judgment for defendant after general demurrer to complaint
was sustained and plaintiff refused to amend, reversed.
P. M. Barceloux, Burtoll J. Goldstpin, Goldstein, Barceloux & Goldstein and Rpginald M. Watt for Appellallts.
Glelln D. Newton and "\VilJiam W. Coshow for Respondent.
Stanley Mosk, Attol"lwy General, Charles A. Barrett, Assistant Attorney General, and Frederick G. Girard, Deputy
Attorney General, Dioll Il. Holm, City Attorney (San Francisco), William l<~. Bonrne and Beatrice Challiss, Deputy City
Attorneys, Jenuinbrs, Engstrand & Henrikson and Paul D.
Engstrand, Jr., as Amiei Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plailltiff Louisa C. Muskopf was a paying
patient ill the Corning Memorial Hospital. She and her husband allege that because of the negligl:'llCe of the hospital staff
she fell and further injured the broken hip for which she was
being' treated. Defendant demurretl on the ground that the
Corning Hospital District is im!l1une from liability for tort
under the rule of Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hospital District, 41 Ca1.2d 33 [257 P.2d 22], which held that a
hospital district was a state agency exercising a governmental
function and as such was immune from tort liability. Defendant's demurrer was sustained, and upon plaintiffs' refusal to
amend the court entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs
appeal.
Plaintiffs contend that operating a hospital is a proprietary
function of government and that in any event the rule of
goYcrlllllcntal inlllllmity sllon1<1 hc dist'ardl'd.
[1] After a reevaluation of the rule of governmental immunity from tort liability we ltuye coneluded that it must be
discarded as mistaken and unjust.
The rule of ho~pital district tort immunity was based on
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('ases upholding county hospital immunity. (Shcl'bounle v.
Yuba County, 21 Cal. 113, 114-115 [81 Am.Dec. 151] ; Calkins
v. Newton, 36 Cal.App:2d 262,264-268 [97 P.2d 523] ; Griffin
v. County of Coll/sa, 44 Cal.App.2d 915, 919-922 [113 P.2d
270.) Thcse cases rcst on the grountls that a county, like the
state, can act only in governmental capacity and that a hospital
is proteetcd by the rule of charitable immuuity. [2, 3] The
latter doctrine has becn abolished in this state. (Silva v.
Providence Hospital, 14 Ca1.2d 762, 764-776 [97 P.2d 798] ;
Malloy v. Fong, 37 Ca1.2d 356, 364·367 [232.P.2d 241]), and
it is now settled that the state, like a municipality, can act in
a proprietary capacity. (People v. Superior Court, 29 Ca1.2d
754, 761-762 [178 P.2d 1, 40 A.L.R.2d 919].) Subsequent
to the Talley case, other decisions of this court have expanded
the area of the statc's proprictary activities. (Guidi v. State.
41 Ca1.2d 623, 626-628 [262 P.2d 3] ; Pianka v. State, 46 Ca1.2d
208, 210 [293 P .2d 458].)
The shifting fortune of the rule of governmental immunity
as applied to hospitals is illustrative of the history of the
rule itself. From the beginning there has been misstatement,
confusion, and retraction. At the earliest common law the
doctrine of "sQvereign immnnity" did not produce the harsh
results it does today. It was a rule that allowed substantial
relief. It began as the personal prerogative of the king, gained
impetus from sixteenth century metaphysical concepts, may
have been based on the misreading of an ancient maxim, and
only rarely had the effect of completely denying compensation. 1 How it became in the United States the basis for a
rule that the federal and state governments did not have to
answer for their torts has been called '( one of the mysteries
'Sovereign immunity began with the personal prerogatives of the King
of England. In the fcudal structure the lord of the manor was not Bub·
ject to suit in his own courts. (1 Pollock and Maitland, The History of
English Law [1909 ed.] 518.) The king, the highest feudal lord, en·
joyed the same protection: no court was above him. (1 Pollock and
Maitland, The History of English Law, supra, at pp. 512·517; 3 Holds·
worth, History of English Law (1D22 ed.) 462.) Before the sixteenth
century this right of the king was purely personal. (Watkins, The State
as a Party Litigant 12 [Johns lIopkin~ {;niversity Studies in History
and Political Science, Series XLV, No.1 (H)27)].) Only out of sixteenth
century mctaphysical concepts of the nature of the state did the king's
personal prerogative become the sovcreign immunity of the state. (Watkins, The State as :t Party Litigant, slIpra, at p. 11; see 4 Holdsworth,
The History of English Law, supra, at pp, I!fO·19i.) There is some c\'ielenee tbat the original meaning of n'e \IT<' sixtcpnth ('"ntl1ry maximthat the king can do no wrong--was mcrely that the king was not
privileged to do wrong. (Borchard, Corcrnlllrllia/ Rc-,ponsilJility in Tort,
34 Yale L.J. I, 2; Ehrlich, Procc0dings Against the Crown (1216·1377)
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of legal evolution." (Borchard, GOL'ernmental Responsibility
in Tort, 34 Yale L.J., I, 4.)
The rule of county or local district immunity did not
originate with the concept of sovereign immunity. Thc first
case to hoM that local government units were not liable for
tort was Russell v. Men of DCl"ct1l, 100 Eng.Rep. 359. The
case iuvolyed au actiou in tort agaiust au unincorporated
county. The action was disallowed on two grounds: since
the group was uuincorporated there was no fund out of which
at pp. 42, 121 [Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, vol. \'1
(1921) ].)
The immunity operated more as a laek of jurisdiction in tlle king's
courts than as a denial of total relief'. There was jurisdiction, however,
in the Court of Exchequer for equitable relief against the crown. " •.•
the party ought in this case to be relieved against the King, beeause
the King is the fountain and head of jUlltice and equity; and it shall
not be presumed, that lie will be <lefecti\""e in either. And it would dero·
gatc from the King's bon our to imagine, that what is equity against a
common person should not be equity against him." (Per Atkyns, B.,
Pawlett v. ..!I.ttomey General (1668), Hadres 465, 468, 145 Eng.Rep. 5,jO,
552; Dyson v . .dttorney·GeneraZ (1912),1 K. B. no, 415.)
The method for obtaining legal relief against the crown was tbe
petition of right. The action could not be brought in the king'8 courts
hecause of tbeir lack of jurisdiction to bear elaims against him. The
petition of right sta.ted a claim against the king, whicb was barred only
by his prerogative. To the petition •• there must always be a reply:
'Let right be done,' .. (Holdsworth, The History of Remedies .dgaiMI
The Cr01L'n, 38 L.Quar.Rev. HI, 149) and " .•• it is clear tllat the
petition has assumed tbe character of a definite legal remedy against
the Crown." (ld. at p. 150.) There were procedural difficulties with
the petition, but alternate remedies existed in large part. (let at pp. 156161.)
The main use of the petition of right in the early common law was
in real actions, which then covered a wide field. (Holdsworth, Remedies
4.gain8t The CrOW1/" supra, at p. 152.) The basic principle was that the
petition was proper "whenever the subject could show a legal right to
redress." (ld. at p. 156.)
Tbe early precedents may even be read as allowing a petition of right
against the king for the torts of his servants. (See the cases of Robert
(1325) and Gervais (1340) de Clifton, discussed in Ehrlich, Proceedings
Against The Crown, supra, at pp. 123·126; Watkins, The State as a Party
Litigant, 8upra, at pp. 20 n. 36.) In Tobin v. The Queen (1864), 16
C.B.N.S. 309, 111 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 309, however, the court refused
to so read the precedents, and held tbat the crown was not liable for
the torts of its servants. This decision arose because of the fOTDlalistic
and mistllken idea tbat concepts of vicarious liability did not apply to
the crown. (See Holdsworth, Remedies .dgain8t The CrolL'n, supra, at
pp. 294·296; Watkins, The State as a Party Litigant, 81/pra, at p. 25.)
Under the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, however, the crown is today
liable for the torts of its servants to the same extent as private persons.
(Hals. Laws of England, vol. XXXII, §§ 21)3 A, B [Cum. Sup. 1953}.)
One otber protection was afforded the subject injured by the king's
servants. Many of tile king's officers were liable for the wrongs com·
mitted, and from the earliest times tbose officers bad to have a sufficient
financial standing to Dlake those remedies against them meaningful. (See
Ehrlich, Proceedings Against Tbe Crown, supra, at pp. 200, 214.)
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the judgment could be paid; and" it is better that an irHli·
vidual should su:,;tain an injury than that the public 8hon1l1
suffer an inconvenience.': (100 Eng. Rep. 359, 862.) The
rule of the Russell ease was first brought into this country h~'
Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 249 [6 Am.Dec. 63]. Thcl'e
the county was incorporated, could sue and be sued, and there
was a corporate fund out of which a judgment could be satisfied. Ignoring these differences, the Massachusetts court
adopted the rule of the Russell case, which became the general
American rule.
If the reasons for Russell v. Men of Devon and the rule of
county or local district immunity ever had any substance
they have none today. [ 4] Public convenience does not
outwcigh individual compensation, and a suit against a county
hospital or hospital district is against an entity legally and
financially capable of satisfying a jUdgment. Thus, it was
judicially recognized in England over half a century ago
that a public hospital is liable for its torts. (Hillyer v. St.
Bartholomew's Hospital (1909), 2 K.B. 820, 825.)
[5] The rule of governmental immunity for tort is an
anachronism, without rational basis, and bas existed only by
the force of inertia. (See Borchard, Governmental Responsibility for Tort, 84 Yale L.J. 129, 229; Casner and Fuller,
Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 IIarv. L. Rev. 437;
Repko, Commentary on Municipal Tort Liability, 9 Law &
Cont. Prob. 214.) It has been judicially abolished in other
jurisdictions. (Molitor v. Kanel.and Community U'nit District
No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11 [163 N.E.2d 89,90-96] ; Colorado Racing
Com. v. Brllsh Racing Assn., 136 Colo. 279 [316 P.2d 582,
585-586] ; Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach (Fla.), 96 So.2d
130, 132-134 [60 A.L.R.2d 1193].)
None of the reasons for its continuance can withstand
analysis. No one defends total governmental immunity. In
fact, it does not exist. It has become riddled with exceptions,
both legislative (Gov. Code, §§ 50140, 530.)1; l~d. Code, § 903;
Veh. Code, § 17001) and judicial (Chafor v. City of Long
Beach, 174 Cal. 478, 481-483 [163 P. 70, Ann.Cas. 1918D
106, L.R.A. 1917E 685] ; People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d
754, 761-762 [178 P.2d 1, 40 A.L.R.2d 919]), and the exceptions operate so illogically as to cause serious inequality.
Some who are injnred by governmental agencies can recover,
others cannot: one injured while attending a community
theater in a public park may recover (Rhodes v. City of Palo
Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336, 341-342 [223 P.2d 639]), but one
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injured ill a children's pla.'·groUllllmil.\' not (Far/"dl Y. City
of Long Beach, 132 Cal.App.2d 818, 819-820 [283 P.2d 296]j ;
for torts committed in the course of a n governmcntal fnnction" there is no liability, unless the tort be classified as
a nuisance (Phillips v. City of Pa.sadena, 27 Ca1.2d 104, 100
[162 P.2d 625]). The illogical and inequitable extreme is
reached in this case: we are asked to affirm a rule that denies
recovery to one injured in a county or hospital district hospital, although recovery may be had by one injured ill a city
and county hospital. (Beard v. City ff County of San Francisco, 79 Cal.App.2d 753,755-768 [180 P.2d 744].)
Artidc XX, section 6 of the California Constitution providl.'S: "Suits may be brought against the State ill such manner
and in such courts as shall he directed by law."
[6] Health
and Safety Code, section 32121, subdivision (b), provides that
a hospital district shall have the power "To sue and be sucd
in all courts and places anel in all actions and proceedingi'
whatever." Since the L('gislature has set forth the manner
[all actions and proceedings] and the courts [aU courts] in
which suits against a hospital district may be brought it
would seem to follow that in such suits judgIllent may be
entered against the hospital district.
Previous cases, however, have differentiated between the
state's consenting to be sued and its substantive liahility, and
have hc1<1 that the language used in section 32121, subdivision
(b), and ill article XX, section 6, gives only the state's consent to be sued and does not waive any defenses or immunities. TIm>;, an 1893 statute (Stats. 1893, p. 57, now Gov. COde,
§ 641) providing that those having claims for negligence
against the state were authorized "to bring suit thereon ... "
was held not to waive the state's sovereign immunity but only
to give its consent to be sued when it was otherwise liable.
(Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316, 319 [55 P. 10001, citing
Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 690, 693 [38 P. 457, 43 Am.St.
Rep. 158]; :'Ild/Jin v. Staff', 121 Cal. 16, 23 [53 P. 416].)
[7] It is contellded, howen-r, that arti('le XX, section 6,
should be interpreted as also having snbstantiye signifirance
and establishing the rule of immunity. Such an interpretation
would he contrary to People v. Superio/" Court, 29 Cal.2d 754,
761-762 [178 P.2<1 1,40 A.L.R-2rl 91!l1, Guidi v. State, 41 Cal.
2d 623, 626-6~8 r262 P.~tl 31, anil Pianka v. State, 46 Cal.2d
208, 210 [293 P.2/1 4381. whit·h extendrd thc state's 1iability
to its proprietary activities. If the section has any substantive significance it would appear to be a waiver of immunity.
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On its face it seems to say that the state may be held liable
when suits are brought against it in aecordanec with a legislath'ely prescribed procedure. Consistent, however, with our
previous construction of essentially identical statutory language, we hold that article XX, section 6, provides merely for
a legislative consent to suit.
It is streuuously urged, however, that it is for the Legislature and not the courts to remove the existing governmental
immunities. Two basic arguments are made to deny the
court's power: first, that by enacting various lttatutes affecting
immunity the Legislature has determined that no further
change is to be made by the court; and second, that by the
force of stare decisis the rule has become so firmly entrenched
that only the Legislature can change it. Neither argument is
persuasive.
The doctrine of governmental immunity was originally
court made. [8] The Legislature early adopted a statute
allowing the state to "sue or be sued" (Gov. Code, § 641)
and a similar statute applies to hospital districts (Health &
Saf. Code, § 32121, subd. (b». Although those statutes have
been construed as providing only a waiver from·suit and not a
waiver of substautiye immunity (!lclvin v. State, 121 Cal.
16, 23 [53 P. 416]), their continuous reenactment indicates a
clear legislative purpose to remove all procedural obstacles
when the state is liable.
The state has also enacted various statutes \vaivilig substantive immunity in certain areas. (Gov. Code, § 53051 [dangerous or defective condition of pnblic property] ; Gov. Code,
§ 50140 [damage by mobs or riots] ; Ed. Code, § 903 [liability
of school district] ; Veh. Code, § 17001 [public agency liability
for negligent operation of motor vehicle J.) Defendant contenils that by removing immunity in these areas the Legislature has retained it in all others.
'We are not here faced with a situation in which the Legil'!lature has adopted an t'stahlished judirial interpretation by
repeated reenactment of a statute. (Richfield Oil Corp. v.
Pllblic rtiliflJ Com., 54 Ca1.2d 4]9, 430 [6 Cal.Rptr. 548,354
P.2d 4J.) Nor are we faced with a comprehensive legislative
I'naetmrnt designed to tOYer a field. What is hefore us is a
i'!C'ries of sporadic statntC's, each operating on a separate area
of govC'rnmC'lltal immunity wherC' its evil was felt most.
[9] Defendant "'ouM haY!' UI'! sa.v that because the Legislature has l'<>lllowd ~()v('l'nmC'lItal immunity in these areas
we are powC'rlC'ss to rrlllOY(' it in othrrs. We r<'ad the statutes
as meaning only what thC'y sa~': that in the areas indicated
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there shall be no gOVl'l'llll1cntal immuuity. They leave to the
court whether it shoul!l adhere to its own rule of immunity ill
other areas.
[ 10] Defemlant also urges that even if the Legislature
has not adopted the rule of governmental immunity ill the
areas ill whieh it lIas not rxpl'essly abolished it, the rule has
existed for so long that only the Legislature has the power to
change it. The" rule" of governmental immunity, however,
has not existed with the force that its repetitiol1 would impl~-.
From its inception there has beeu constant judicial restrietioll,
going hand in hand with accompanying legislative restridiOll.
Municipal corporations were first held subject to the court's
equitable jurisdiction (Sprillg Valley Wafer Works v. City &Coulity of San Francisco, 82 Cal. 286, 307-311 [22 P. 910, 16
Am.St.Rep. 116, 6 L.RA. 756]). They were then held liable
for their proprietary aets (Chafor v. City of LOllg Beach, 174
Cal. 478, 481-483 [163 P. 70, Anu.Cas. 1918D 106, hR.A.
1917E 685]), "'hit'll ha\'(' b,'rl1 eonstantly expanlll'(l. Thus,
a community theater in a public park (Rho£1rs ". Cily of Palo
Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336, 341-342 [223 P.2d 639]) ; a public
golf course (Plaza v. City of Sail Mateo, 123 Cal.App.2tl 103,
106-112 [266 P.2d 523]) ; an electric lighting plant (Dat'oust
v. City of .Lllalll('da, 1·19 CaL 69, 72·74 [84 P. 760, 9 Ann. Cas.
847, 5 L.R.A. N.S. 536]) ; and the furnishing of impure water
(Ritferbtrseh v. City of Pittsbu/'{}, 205 Cal. 84, 86-88 [269
P. 930, 61 .A.r..R. 4481), haye all furll isht>d the basis for
municipal liability. Moreover, the concept of proprietary
acts has been cxtcnded to the state and its agencies (People Y.
Superior Court, 29 Ca1.2d 7M, 761-762 [178 P.2d 1, 40 .A.L.R.
2d 919]), and the liahility of the state under tbat ('onccpt is
increasing. (Guidi v. State, 41 Ca1.2d 623, 626-628 [262 P.2d
3]; Pianka v. State, 46 Cal.2d 208, 210 [293 P.2d 458].)
Finally, there is gOVl'rnmental lial)ility for nuisances even
when they involve governmental activity. (Phillips v. City
of Pasadena, 27 Ca1.2d 104, 106 [162 P.2d 625}.)
[11] In formulating "rules" and "exceptions" we nre
apt to forget that when there is negligence, the rule is liability,
immunity is the exception. This conrt implemeut('d that poli(~y
when it overruled the doctrine of charitahle immullity. (SilM
v. Providence Hospital, 14 Ca1.2d 762, 764-776 [97 P.2<l 798] ;
MaUoy v. Fong, 37 CaL~M 356, 364-367 r232 P.2<l 241]), an
immunity that was also claimed to he so fil'mly imbrddr<1 that
only the L('gislature could change it.
[12] Abrogation of governmental immunit.y does not
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mean that the state is liable for all harms that result from its
activities. Both Ihr state allll individuals are free to engage
in many activities that result in harm to others so long as snell
activities are not tortious. Thus the harm resulting from
free competition alllollg individuals is not actionable, nor i,'i
the harm resulting from tIle diversion of business by the state's
relocation of a higll\\"a~·. (People v. SyI/lOIl,~, 54 Cal.2d 85:),
859 [9 Cal.Rptr. 363, 357 P.2d 451] ; Hollotcay v. Purcell,
35 Ca1.2d 220, 230 [217 P.2d 665].) It does not follow,
however, that torts may 110t be committed iI}. carrying on
such activities. A competitor may be liable for the harm resulting from his violation of traffic laws in getting his product
to market, just as the state may be liable for the harm caused
by its agents' violation of such laws. [13] Although it "is
not a tort for Government to govern" (Jackson, J., dissenting
in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 [73 S.Ct. 956,
97 L.Ed. 1427]), and basic policy decisions of government
within constitutional limitations are therefore necessarily nontortious, it does not follow that the state is immune from liability for the torts of its agents. These considerations are relevant
to the question whether in any given case the state through its
agents has committed a tort (see 3 Davis, Administrative Law
(1958), § 25.11, p. 482; § 25.13, p. 489), but once it is determined that it has, it must meet its obligation therefor.
Nor does our decision herein affect the settled rules of immunity of government officials for acts within the scopc of
their authority. [ 14] Moreover, since defendant's employees are not immune from liability for their negligence in
caring for and treating plaintiff, the question of the extent to
which the state shoilld be immunc when its officers are is not
involved in this case. (See L1:pman v. Brisbane Elementary
School Disf., post, p. 224 [11 Ca1.Rptl'. 97,359 P.2d 465].)
[15] GOYCrtlll1eut officials are liable for the negligent perfOl'mallc·c of their ministerial duties (1llock v. Santa Rosa,
126 Cal. 330, 334 [58 P. 826] ; Payne v. Baehr, 153 Cal. 441,
414 [95 P. 895]) but are not liable for their discretionary
nds within the scope of their authority (Downer v. Lent, 6
Cal. 94, !J5 [95 Am.Dec. 4891 ; NCH'pOI·t WTtfll',f & Lbr. CO. Y.
Drew, 141 Cal. 103, 107-108 [74 P. 697] j Oppenheimer v.
Arnold, !J9 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [222 P.2d 940] ; JIartelli Y.
Pollock, 162 Cal.App.2d 655, 659-660 [328 P.2d 795]), even
if it is alleged that they acted maliciously (White v. Towers,
37 Cal.2d 727, 730-732 [235 P.2(1 209. 28 A.hR.2d 636];
Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal.2d 315, 322 [239 P.2d 876];
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Hardy v. Vial,48 Ca1.2d 577,582-584 [311 P.2d 494]). Such
immunity is not designed to protcct the guilty, for" if it were
possible in praetice to confine such complaints to the guilty,
it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification
for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim
is well founded uutil the case has been tried, and that to
submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome,
would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the
most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties .
. . . In this instance it has been thought in the end better
to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant
dread of retaliation." (Learned Hand, J., in Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581; see also Hardy v. Vial, 48 Ca1.2d
577,582-583 [311 P.2d 494].) Thus this immunity rests on
grounds entirely independent of those that have been advanced to justify the immunity of the state from liability
for torts for which its agents are admittedly liable.
Only the vestigial remains of such governmental immunity
have survived; its requiem has long been foreshadowed. For
years the process of erosion of governmental immunity has
gone on unabated. The Legislature has contributed mightily
to that erosion. The courts, by distinction and extension,
have removed much of the force of the rule. Thus, in holding
that the doctrine of governmental immunity for torts for
whieh its agents are liable has no place in our law we make
no startling break with the past but merely take the final step
that carries to its conclusion an established legislative and
judicial trend.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-As recently as 1958 this court,
in Vater v. County of Glenn, 49 Ca1.2d 815, 820 [4] [323
P.2d 85] (per Chief Justice Gibson, with only Justice Carter
dissenting), although it expressly recognized that there has
been much learned criticism of the principle of governmental
immunity, held that" abrogation or restriction of this doctrine
is primarily a legislative matter." And Talley v. Norfhet'll
San Diego County II ospital Dist. (1933), 41 Ca1.2d 33, 41
[15] [257 P.2d 22] (per Justice Shenk, with only Justice
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Carter dissenting), upon facts materially identical with those
of the present case, held that "Whcther the doctrine of
sovereign immunity should be modified in this state is a
legislativc question." Also this court, ill denyiug pctitionK
for hearing after decisions of the District Courts of Appeal,
has during the last decade frequently adhered to this view.!
But today's majority, apparel1tl~- impatient with the Legislature's failure to act as speedily and eomprehensiyely as
they believe it should, usurp the legislative fuuction, rcfuse
reasonable respect for the doctrine of sta1'e dec·isis, and sweepingly allUOUllee (a Itt c, p. 21:3) that "A [tel' a rcc\'aluution
of the rule of governmental immunity from tort liability we
have concluded that it must be discarded as mistaken and
unjust."2
Our state Constitution, the instrument which rules (or
should rule) our decisions, provides (art. III, § 1), "The
powers of the governmellt 0f the State of California shall
be divided into three separate departments-the legislative,
executive, and judicial; and no person l:harged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions appertaiuing to either of
the others, except as in this Constitution expressly directed
or permitted. "
It appears that the Legislature specifically intended that
a governmental unit such as the one sued here-a hospital
district--should not be liable for the torts of its employes
under the principle of respondeat s1lperior. Since this court
held in the Talley case (1953), supl'a, 41 Ca1.2d 33, 40 [14],
that substantive immuuity was not abolished by subdivision
(b) of section 32121 of the Health nnd Safety Code (which
provides that hospital districts have power "To sue and be
sued in all courts and places and in all actions and proceed1County 0/ Butte v. Superior Court (1960), 178 Cal.App.2d 310, 311
[2 Cal.Rptr. 913] (hearing denied); Ingram v. County Of Glenn (1960),
177 Cal.App.2d 649, 650 [I, 2] [2 Cal.Rptr. 3041; Durst v. County of
Collisa (19;38), 166 Cal.App.2d 623, 62.3 [1] [;~33 P.2d 789] (11caring
deniell); Madison v. City .s- COllnty of San Francisco (1951), 106 Cal.
App.2d 232, 244-24;; [234 P.2d 99;;, 236 P.2d In 1 (hearing denied);
Latham v. Santa Clara COllnty lIo.~pital (1951),104 Cnl.App.2d 336, 331
[1] [231 P.2d 513] (hearing denied).
"Thc scope of this pronouncement is (lefined by the further statement
(anl(', 1'- !!20) that "!\or docl$ our ael'isiun her('in nffect the sC'ttkd
rulC's of immunity of government offi~hlls for nets within the scope of
their authority. Moreo\-er, sinre (lcfen<lnnt's eruployl'(,s nrc not immune
from liability for their nq~ligcucc in caring for amI trl'ating plnintiff,
the qnestion of the extent to. which the state should be immune when its
officers are is not iuvolved in this cnse. (See Lipman v. Brisballo Elemt'71lary 8cllool Vis/., post, p. 224 [11 Cal.Rptr. 97, 359 P.2d 465].) "
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ings whatever"), four umelllimeu ts of section 32121 have become effective (Stats. 1949, eh. 964; Stats. 1951, ch. 536; Slats.
1953, ch. 1208; Stats. 1957, ch. 641) and several other sections
concerning the powers of hospital districts have been amended
or added, but the Legislature has refrained from providiug
for their tort liability in a situation such as that in Talley
and the preseut case. (Au even more direct example of
legislative recognition of, and failure to abolish, governmental
immunity is found ill the 'Vater Code sections considered in
the Vater case (1958), supra, 49 Ca1.2d 815, 818-819 [3].)
While this court was repeatedly holding that abolishment
of governmental immunity was a legislative question, the
Legislature enacted various statutes which reduced such immunity in certain fields but did not abolish it, and enacted
and reenacted statutes which dealt with the related problem
of suability of the government; therefore, it should be concluded that the Legislature agreed with this court that the
questions should be resolved by statute rather than judicial
decision. (See Richfield Oil Corp. v. Public Util. Com. (1960),
54 Ca1.2d 419,430 [2] [6 Clll.llpt1'. :>48, 354 r.2d 4].)
" • [1]n adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed
to have had knowledge of existing domestic judicial decisions
and to have enacted aud amended statutes in the light of such
decisions as have a direct bearing upon them.' [Buckley v.
Chadwick (1955),45 Ca1.2d 183, 200 [14] (288 P.2d 12, 289 P.
2d 242).J The failure of the Legislature to change the law
in 8 particular respect when the subject is generally before
it and changes in other respects are made is indicative of
an intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not
amended." (Cole v. Rush (1955),45 Ca1.2d 345, 355 [8,9)
[289 P.2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137J.) Yet the majority refuse
to apply the just quoted rules and say instead that the "continuous reenactment" of section 32121 (suhd. (b» indicates
only "a clear legislative purpose to remove all procedural
obstacles when the state is liable." (Allte, p. 218.) An
informed refusal to respect either the doctrine of stare decisis
or the constitutional division of powers seems manifest.
One of the grounds upou which the majority seek to justify
their invasion of the legislative province is that statutory and
judicial exceptions to the governmental immuuity doctrine
"operate so illogically as to cause serious inequality." (Ante,
p. 216.) 1 had thought that the Legislature could abolish
immunity in some areas and modify it in others, as it has
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done, without judicial interference with its efforts, so long
as the unevenness of the legislation was not so great as to be
unconstitutional.
Furthermore, I am impelled to comment that it is unfortunate that a court's reversal of itself on a point of law
which it has recently and repeatedly considered should appear
to depend upon a change of personnel. A change of court
personnel is not, in my concept of judicial duty (under our
historie form of government), properly to be regarded <ll>
carte blanche for the judiciary to effectuate either a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment. . Such power, I
think, should be exercised only by the People or by representa.
tives directly responsible to them.
Because I believe that the question of abolishing governmental immunity is for the Legislature, I would affirm the
judgment.
McComb, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February
21, 1961. Scbauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.
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